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1、<p><b>  外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯譯文</b></p><p><b>  原文</b></p><p>  Performance Audit and Public Management Reform</p><p>  Audit is one of the oldest and most venerable

2、state functions. The French Cour des Comptes traces its origins back to 1318; the UK National Audit Office cites 1314 as the date of its first manifestation; the Dutch Algemene Rekenkamer finds ancestors as running back

3、to 1386.State audit thus long preceded the emergence of modern forms of democratic government. However state audit offices have made many adaptations in the course of their long history and during the nineteenth and twen

4、tieth centurie</p><p>  On this kind of historical scale, performance audit is a very recent activity. Although more or less plausible claims can be made for the existence of performance audit-like activitie

5、s back to the 1960s—or even considerably earlier—performance audit as a large-scale, self-considerably distinct practice dates mainly since the late 1970s.Performance audit represents a modern variant of audit—not the on

6、ly one but, as well shall demonstrate, a challenging and fascinating one. It is distinctive to st</p><p>  Over almost exactly the same period as performance audit has emerged as a distinct form of audit, th

7、e government of Western Europe, North America, and Australasia have embarked upon extensive programs of public management reform. These have aimed at modernizing, streamlining, and in some cases minimizing the whole of t

8、he state apparatus. Although the details of these reform programs have varied considerably between one country and another, most of them have given a central place to the themes of</p><p>  Prima facie, it a

9、ppears highly probable that there is a connection between these two phenomena: on the hand the growth of performance audit and on the other the search for a new solution to the ancient governmental problem of giving auto

10、nomy yet retaining control. Yet there seems to have been little systematic investigation of what the nature of this interaction might be. One of our ambitions is to fill this gap. We begin, in the next chapter, by lookin

11、g at the boundaries and definitions of perf</p><p>  If the official descriptions are anything to go by, performance audit is not just a technical tool. It does not at all correspond to the traditional image

12、 of auditing as a process centered on ‘checking the books’ in order to see that they have been accurately and properly kept. Performance audit has a more ambitious manifesto. Its practitioners declare that they are seeki

13、ng to establish whether public policies or programs or projects or organizations have been conducted with due regard to econom</p><p>  In that chapter we will also take a brief look at some of the many othe

14、r uses to which the term ‘a(chǎn)udit’ has recently been put, a diversification of meaning and practice that recently led one academic to write an ambitious text entitled The Audit Society. For the moment, however, it will suf

15、fice to say that sets of practices termed ‘performance audit’ or value-for-money studies’ have become central activities for an increasingly powerful group of organizations-Supreme Audit Institutions. In most </p>

16、<p>  Given these general characteristics, one might expect that the considerable community of scholars working in subjects such as political science, public administration, public management, and public finance an

17、d accountancy would have generated a large literature about performance audit. Surprisingly, this is not the case. One may speculate on the reasons why SAIs and, within them, performance audit have suffered relative negl

18、ect as compared with, say, various aspects of public management reform.</p><p>  Several reasons for the apparent disparity of interest in performance audit and public management reform suggest themselves. T

19、o begin with, public management reform has been led—or at least fronted—by politicians, for whom it is natural to make public claims that what they are doing is innovative, valuable, and successful. Furthermore, such cha

20、nge has generated its own supporting ‘industry’, including various kinds of consultant who have taken every opportunity to propel such reform even higher </p><p>  Finally, there is, of course, a difference

21、of scale. Public management reform has swept across entire public sectors, affecting ministries, executive agencies, quangos, local authorities, and other kinds of public body. SAIs, by contrast, are single organizations

22、, seldom employing more than a few hundred staff. Thus, changes in what auditors do simply do not appear to be as important or newsworthy as changes that affect the work of tens or hundreds of thousands of public officia

23、ls, and which may</p><p>  Even if the above considerations go some way towards explaining the relative lack of media and scholarly attention given to the development of performance audit, that does not mea

24、n that such activities are insignificant. On the contrary—and as we shall show--performance audit has become the largest single activity for some SAIs and an important part of the work of all the SAIs in this study. This

25、 is a relatively recent development. Although the definition of performance audit is less than strai</p><p>  While governments have declared themselves to be intensely concerned with the ‘three Es’ (economy

26、, efficiency, and effectiveness) at the same time as SAIs have been developing performance audit as a way of investigating those same three Es, the connection between these two lines of activity has not been as straightf

27、orward as might at first appear. Of course, some impacts are fairly obvious. For example, a recent UK National Audit Office handbook acknowledges that performance audit has had to res</p><p>  Our aim has th

28、erefore been to study the practice of performance audit and relate it to contemporary developments in public management. We have investigated the ‘state of the art’ of performance audit and explored its links with the pr

29、ocesses of management reform. In empirical terms, we have had twin foci. First, we have gathered material about public management reform in each country—this describes the context in which SAIs have developed performance

30、 audit. Much of this has necessarily been seco</p><p>  We have therefore counted, categorized, and read a large number of audit reports. In practical terms, these seemed the least unsatisfactory unit for co

31、mparative analysis. They had the advantage of being concrete, discrete, and the basis for a number of recording systems within SAIs themselves. Unfortunately, however, they also carried some disadvantages. First, not all

32、 SAIs distinguish between performance audit reports and other types of report. Second, not all performance audit reports are in t</p><p>  In conclusion, we should say that, although this work is certainly n

33、ot intended to be prescriptive, we have nevertheless thought it appropriate in the final chapter, to set out an agenda for discussion. Drawing from our descriptions and analyses, we have identified a number of issues lik

34、ely to shape the future development of performance audit. In effect, these constitute a set of strategic choices, with significant implications for the roles of SAIs. Some of these issues could be clarified by fu</p&g

35、t;<p>  Source: Christopher Pollott, Hikka Summa. Performance Audit and Public Management Reform[M], Performance or Compliance, 2009.</p><p><b>  譯文</b></p><p>  績(jī)效審計(jì)與公共管理改革&l

36、t;/p><p>  審計(jì)是最古老且最莊嚴(yán)的國(guó)家職責(zé)之一,法國(guó)審計(jì)院的歷史可以追溯到1318年。英國(guó)國(guó)家審計(jì)處將1314年作為首次審計(jì)的日期;荷蘭總審計(jì)局的審計(jì)活動(dòng)最早可以追溯到1386年。因此,國(guó)家審計(jì)早前是出現(xiàn)在民主政府的現(xiàn)代形式中的。然而,國(guó)家審計(jì)處在19世紀(jì)與20世紀(jì)這一漫長(zhǎng)的歷史過(guò)程中順應(yīng)形勢(shì),為自己塑造了一個(gè)在機(jī)構(gòu)里至關(guān)重要的民主責(zé)任的角色。</p><p>  在歷史的發(fā)展中,績(jī)

37、效審計(jì)是最近才開(kāi)展起來(lái)的活動(dòng)。盡管有點(diǎn)看似合理的聲明就能夠完全說(shuō)明類(lèi)似績(jī)效審計(jì)活動(dòng)的存在,可以追溯到 20世紀(jì)60年代,甚至更早,績(jī)效審計(jì)作為一個(gè)大規(guī)模自覺(jué)的獨(dú)立實(shí)踐的活動(dòng)是在20世紀(jì)70年代后期確定下來(lái)的???jī)效審計(jì)代表了一種現(xiàn)代的不同于傳統(tǒng)的審計(jì),雖然不是唯一的一個(gè),就如我們所證明的,它具有挑戰(zhàn)性并且具有吸引力。相對(duì)與國(guó)家審計(jì),績(jī)效審計(jì)的顯著特點(diǎn)在于它不出現(xiàn)在私營(yíng)部門(mén)和商業(yè)審計(jì)。</p><p>  幾乎同時(shí),

38、績(jī)效審計(jì)顯示出了一種不同于一般財(cái)務(wù)審計(jì)的模式。在西歐,北美和澳大利亞政府已開(kāi)始廣泛的公共管理改革方案。這些都旨在現(xiàn)代化,精簡(jiǎn)化,以及在某些情況下最大限度地整合了整個(gè)國(guó)家機(jī)器的結(jié)構(gòu)。盡管這些改革方案的細(xì)節(jié)在不同國(guó)家之間各異,但他們中的大部分都將分散集權(quán)和績(jī)效管理放在了一個(gè)重要的位置。這包含了如何平衡自治權(quán)和公共組織控制兩者之間關(guān)系的廣泛思考。它產(chǎn)生了一個(gè)對(duì)激勵(lì)機(jī)制的探索,將有助于在實(shí)踐中尋找新的管理理念。</p><p

39、>  表面上,似乎極有可能是有這兩種現(xiàn)象之間的連接:一方面績(jī)效審計(jì)的發(fā)展,另一方面尋找一個(gè)新的辦法來(lái)解決依舊被政府控制的自治權(quán)這一古老的問(wèn)題。但這看起來(lái)似乎是一種本質(zhì)在相互作用的系統(tǒng)調(diào)查。我們企圖之一便是填補(bǔ)這個(gè)空白。在下一章節(jié),我們開(kāi)始觀察績(jī)效審計(jì)的定義及范圍,并用以描述法國(guó)、芬蘭、荷蘭、瑞典和英國(guó)這五個(gè)國(guó)家之間的以管理模式改革為基礎(chǔ)的比較。為后面章節(jié)所提及的內(nèi)容提供了背景,理出了績(jī)效審計(jì)的發(fā)展和管理改革力量之間的關(guān)系。<

40、/p><p>  如果依據(jù)官方的解釋,那么公共部門(mén)績(jī)效審計(jì)不僅僅只是一種技術(shù)工具。它并不如傳統(tǒng)印象中的審計(jì)只是一個(gè)能夠準(zhǔn)確地、適當(dāng)?shù)亍昂藢?duì)資料”的處理過(guò)程而已。績(jī)效審計(jì)會(huì)有更多的令人興奮的聲明。它的從業(yè)者聲明, 他們正在探求要對(duì)是否要建立起已充分考慮到經(jīng)濟(jì)性和效率性,效果性和良好的管理實(shí)踐性的公開(kāi)政策、程序、計(jì)劃或組織。同時(shí)帶來(lái)的是一個(gè)強(qiáng)有力的新組合:即傳統(tǒng)觀念中的審計(jì)和側(cè)重績(jī)效的現(xiàn)代審計(jì)相結(jié)合。隨著時(shí)間的推移,審計(jì)

41、主體中的確切條款在不同國(guó)家的審計(jì)活動(dòng)間存在變化。所以我們應(yīng)該不要急于明確“績(jī)效審計(jì)”的準(zhǔn)確定義,而是應(yīng)該作為問(wèn)題來(lái)深入探尋它的概念。</p><p>  這一章節(jié)里我們也將簡(jiǎn)要地看一看一些“審計(jì)”在目前定義下的別的用途,審計(jì)實(shí)施和意義上的多樣化近年來(lái)引起了一個(gè)學(xué)者開(kāi)始撰寫(xiě)一部名為《審計(jì)社會(huì)》的鴻篇巨著。然而,目前,它將足夠表明那些被叫做 “績(jī)效審計(jì)”或者“一項(xiàng)物超所值的研究”的實(shí)踐活動(dòng)已經(jīng)成為一個(gè)正在強(qiáng)大起來(lái)的機(jī)

42、構(gòu)組織——最高審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)的中心活動(dòng)。在大多數(shù)民主國(guó)家,最高審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)是一個(gè)接近于國(guó)家機(jī)構(gòu)中心的位置。因此,公共部門(mén)績(jī)效審計(jì)潛在中應(yīng)是具有相當(dāng)大的政治與民主意義。它以強(qiáng)大的、獨(dú)立的公共機(jī)構(gòu)被人們所熟悉,并且以確定其是否應(yīng)該被成立、代價(jià)多少、如何開(kāi)展政府政策和計(jì)劃為目的,以調(diào)查研究為形式被我們所認(rèn)識(shí)。</p><p>  考慮到這些總體特征,我們可能會(huì)希望這些學(xué)者所組成的團(tuán)體所涉及的學(xué)科是那些比如政治學(xué)、公共管理、公共財(cái)

43、政和財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)等一些會(huì)產(chǎn)生大量關(guān)于績(jī)效審計(jì)文獻(xiàn)的學(xué)科。令人驚訝的是,情況不是這樣的。因此,為何我們?cè)谧罡邔徲?jì)機(jī)關(guān)以及其內(nèi)部中忽視了績(jī)效審計(jì)與所謂的公共管理改革各方面對(duì)比的原因是可以推斷出來(lái)的。</p><p>  績(jī)效審計(jì)與公共管理改革的自我建議在表面上的不一致是存在很多原因的。首先,公共管理改革已經(jīng)被引入或者至少被政客所提及,所以對(duì)他們來(lái)說(shuō),公開(kāi)聲稱(chēng)他們正在做的正是有所創(chuàng)新的、具有價(jià)值的以及可預(yù)見(jiàn)能成功的事情是很

44、自然的。此外,這種改變已經(jīng)產(chǎn)生了自己支持的“產(chǎn)業(yè)”,包括各種抓住任何機(jī)會(huì)把政治和行政推向更高層次的各種顧問(wèn)。相比之下,最高審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)是單一的、通常被認(rèn)為是嚴(yán)肅的機(jī)構(gòu)。他們大量的工作似乎是很有技術(shù)性且詳細(xì),并且還要認(rèn)準(zhǔn)自己的立場(chǎng),分清各種政黨政治的爭(zhēng)議。通常,最高審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)會(huì)在那些寫(xiě)關(guān)于一個(gè)國(guó)家的政府體系的教材上被簡(jiǎn)略提到,但很少被寫(xiě)入專(zhuān)門(mén)的書(shū)籍或文章。美國(guó),雖然不是目前研究的一部分,或許是一個(gè)容易被忽視的例外,因?yàn)樗鼘⒁欢〝?shù)量的分析性文字集

45、中在總審計(jì)署上。在過(guò)去的幾年里只有開(kāi)始少量的收集期刊文章和小冊(cè)子的勢(shì)頭。以前,最高審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)很少用自己的方式宣傳自己,他們中的大部分僅僅在過(guò)去的十年里才開(kāi)始生產(chǎn)和普及消費(fèi)那些小冊(cè)子,或者通過(guò)媒體來(lái)積極應(yīng)對(duì)。但始終有一部分對(duì)此持謹(jǐn)慎態(tài)度。</p><p>  當(dāng)然,最后績(jī)效審計(jì)的還存在規(guī)模上的差異。公共管理改革橫掃整個(gè)政府資助企業(yè)、部門(mén)、行政代理、半公營(yíng)機(jī)構(gòu)、地方政府以及其他一些公共體制。相比之下,最高審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)是個(gè)獨(dú)

46、立組織,很少會(huì)雇傭超過(guò)100人的員工。因此,審計(jì)人員的看似不重要且沒(méi)有新聞價(jià)值的簡(jiǎn)單工作的一丁點(diǎn)變動(dòng)反而會(huì)影響幾十或幾百成千上萬(wàn)的公共官員的工作,還可能直接影響公民使用公共服務(wù)。</p><p>  即使上述考慮在某種程度上有助于解釋我們對(duì)媒體和學(xué)術(shù)能夠推動(dòng)績(jī)效審計(jì)發(fā)展這方面缺乏關(guān)注,但這并不意味著,這種活動(dòng)是無(wú)關(guān)緊要的。相反,正如我們將證明的,績(jī)效審計(jì)已經(jīng)成為了最高審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)中最大的獨(dú)立活動(dòng),同時(shí)也是最高審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)

47、在這方面研究的重要部分。這是相對(duì)較新的發(fā)展。雖然績(jī)效審計(jì)的定義沒(méi)能那么明確的表述,但是通過(guò)部分的先例我們可以更準(zhǔn)確的說(shuō),績(jī)效審計(jì)作為獨(dú)特和主流活動(dòng)主要起源于20世紀(jì)70和80年代。因此,在過(guò)去的二十年里,許多國(guó)家的最高審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)都耗費(fèi)了相當(dāng)大的比例的資源用于發(fā)展中地區(qū)的建設(shè),這使得我們將目光直接集中到現(xiàn)代政府的績(jī)效問(wèn)題上。</p><p>  當(dāng)政府已經(jīng)宣布他們強(qiáng)烈關(guān)注3E(經(jīng)濟(jì)、高效、效率)的同時(shí),最高審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)一

48、直在開(kāi)發(fā)一種與3E類(lèi)似的公共部門(mén)績(jī)效審計(jì)調(diào)查方法,使得兩種審計(jì)活動(dòng)之間的聯(lián)系在首次產(chǎn)生的時(shí)候不會(huì)顯得很突兀。當(dāng)然,有些影響是相當(dāng)明顯。例如,最近英國(guó)國(guó)家審計(jì)署在手冊(cè)中承認(rèn),績(jī)效審計(jì)不得不應(yīng)對(duì)這一事實(shí),即: “三分之二的政府業(yè)務(wù)現(xiàn)在被代理、輸出和交付所占據(jù),這些遠(yuǎn)比輸入更重要,還有這將會(huì)給政府業(yè)務(wù)帶來(lái)比私營(yíng)部門(mén)在公開(kāi)資金交付過(guò)程中更嚴(yán)峻的財(cái)政困難?!边@是一個(gè)講述公共管理改革對(duì)績(jī)效審計(jì)產(chǎn)生直接產(chǎn)生影響的例子。然而,整個(gè)局面更為復(fù)雜,直接和間

49、接的影響正在雙向作用。</p><p>  因此,我們的目標(biāo)是要研究績(jī)效審計(jì)的實(shí)踐,和公共管理的當(dāng)代發(fā)展。我們已詳細(xì)調(diào)查績(jī)效審計(jì)這一“國(guó)家的藝術(shù)”, 并探尋與管理改革的進(jìn)程的關(guān)系。在實(shí)證方面,我們有雙灶。首先,我們已經(jīng)收集有關(guān)每一個(gè)國(guó)家的公共管理改革的材料,說(shuō)明了在最高審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)中開(kāi)展績(jī)效審計(jì)的環(huán)境。盡管它源于我們的團(tuán)隊(duì)成員最近的工作,但是許多資料必然還是次要的數(shù)據(jù)。其次,在績(jī)效審計(jì)的關(guān)系方面,我們已經(jīng)進(jìn)行了廣泛的

50、初步研究。我們的要點(diǎn)集中在績(jī)效審計(jì)報(bào)告以及它的處理過(guò)程。其他一些最近的工作,概念上說(shuō)比較復(fù)雜,但依賴(lài)證據(jù)類(lèi)型因而受到限制。我們會(huì)接受?chē)?yán)峻的考驗(yàn)來(lái)爭(zhēng)辯績(jī)效審計(jì)的真正的定義,或者表達(dá)一種最高審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)通常所表達(dá)的即經(jīng)濟(jì)基礎(chǔ)比上層建筑更重要,盡管這兩類(lèi)證據(jù)顯然都對(duì)他們的權(quán)力來(lái)說(shuō)是非常有用的。</p><p>  因此我們計(jì)算、分類(lèi)和閱讀大量的審計(jì)報(bào)告。但具體而言, 這些似乎是在比較分析最不滿(mǎn)意的單位。他們的有利之處在于具

51、體、獨(dú)立以及在國(guó)家最高審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)中有大量記錄系統(tǒng)作為基礎(chǔ)。然而,遺憾的是,他們也有一些不足之處。第一,不是所有國(guó)家最高審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)能夠區(qū)分公共部門(mén)績(jī)效審計(jì)報(bào)告和其他類(lèi)型的報(bào)告。第二,不是所有的公共部門(mén)績(jī)效審計(jì)報(bào)告都是屬于公共領(lǐng)域的。第三,除了獨(dú)立審計(jì)報(bào)告以外,還有其他重要公共部門(mén)績(jī)效審計(jì)的報(bào)告。例如,一些服務(wù)于國(guó)家審計(jì)署的績(jī)效審計(jì)采取的是向部門(mén)而不是向國(guó)會(huì)公共財(cái)務(wù)委員會(huì)提交未公開(kāi)的審計(jì)報(bào)告的模式。大量國(guó)家高層的工作管理會(huì)發(fā)生在未公開(kāi)的被審計(jì)機(jī)

52、構(gòu)和各部門(mén),尤其是那些部級(jí)部門(mén)。第四,國(guó)家間和國(guó)家內(nèi)部的績(jī)效審計(jì)報(bào)告之間會(huì)存在很多變化。他們?cè)诓煌膰?guó)家有不同形式,不同設(shè)置的機(jī)構(gòu)組織,即使是在主體單一的最高審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)中這些報(bào)告也是可長(zhǎng)可短,抑或昂貴抑或廉價(jià),范圍或?qū)捇颡M隘的。事實(shí)上,這些變化是我們的特性描述和評(píng)論的內(nèi)容之一。最后,應(yīng)該指出,選擇不同的分析方式有可能得出不同的見(jiàn)解,可是同時(shí),通過(guò)相同的表征,有可能被隱瞞或掩蓋那些我們所關(guān)注的審計(jì)報(bào)告中已經(jīng)被集中闡述的特征。舉例來(lái)說(shuō), 我們

53、在分析中使</p><p>  總之,我們應(yīng)該說(shuō),雖然這不是特意要求的,然而我們還是認(rèn)為應(yīng)在適當(dāng)?shù)那闆r下在最后一章中對(duì)一項(xiàng)議程進(jìn)行一個(gè)總結(jié)性的討論。從我們的描述和分析中我們認(rèn)識(shí)到了一些可能有利于績(jī)效審計(jì)未來(lái)發(fā)展的問(wèn)題。實(shí)際上, 戰(zhàn)略選擇的組合會(huì)對(duì)國(guó)家最高審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)產(chǎn)生重大影響。其中一些問(wèn)題可以在進(jìn)一步研究中加以澄清。他們都能夠受益于更廣泛和更深入的討論。正如政治太重要了以至于不能由政治家來(lái)決定一樣,我們的最高審計(jì)機(jī)

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